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COVID-19: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Politics
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic forced governments around the world to make tough political decisions about
the cost of saving lives and the limits of doing so. One of the striking aspects of the debates over these
necessary tradeoffs is the relatively little weight individual rights seemed to have carried in these
discussions. At first, this might have seen the triumph of cost-benefit analysis (CBA); and in a sense, it
was. However, the pandemic has also shown the limitations of CBA, especially in the face of severe
uncertainty. This essay reviews some of the sources of uncertainty in the context of the pandemic and
shows how, in the face of such uncertainty, different countries fall back onto their political commitments,
which include concern for individual rights. I thus argue that rather than being in competition to CBA,
political considerations (including concern for individual rights) end up being incorporated into an
impressionistic calculation of costs and benefits of government action. I conclude by suggesting that this
is where future discussion of the theoretical foundations of CBA should focus on.
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seemed to have carried in these discussions. At first, this might have seen the triumph of
cost-benefit analysis (CBA); and in a sense, it was. However, the pandemic has also shown
the limitations of CBA, especially in the face of severe uncertainty. This essay reviews some of
the sources of uncertainty in the context of the pandemic and shows how, in the face of such
uncertainty, different countries fall back onto their political commitments, which include
concern for individual rights. I thus argue that rather than being in competition to CBA,
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OF ALL THAT HAS CHANGED following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,

the one that most immediately afected people’s lives is the stay-at-home orders
that in diferent forms were put in place all over the world. While generally
enjoying popular support, these policies also generated strong reactions from
members of the public, politicians, policymakers, and scholars who worried
that they were insufciently thought through and may end up causing more
harm than good. Te worry boiled down to the view that the policies refected
a panicked response that failed to consider the potential costs of the lockdown
policies. Tis article addresses this question. It is not an attempt to consider every
aspect of these policies; it focuses only on the question of “tradeofs”1 involved in
them. As is clearer with every passing day, the isolation policies have saved many
lives, but they also carry enormous costs, which will be felt for years to come.
How, if at all, should these be weighed against each other?
Tough the particular context in which this question is asked is as novel as
the novel coronavirus, the question itself is not. It is arguably the most signifcant,
most common, and probably also the most difcult, question that policy makers
and lawyers face. For when we move from abstract legal principles to the real
world of implementation and enforcement, where goals always outstrip budgets,
the question is always “at the expense of what?” Other things being equal, a world
with less crime, fewer accidents, cleaner environment, and healthier food than
our own world is a better one. But other things are never equal. Achieving these
goals does not come free; in fact, achieving improvements on some of the goals
just mentioned may make it more difcult to improve on other goals we are also
interested in (for example, greater equality and less poverty).
Many lawyers are often loath to think in these terms. Law, they say, is about
justice, not efciency; life is “priceless”; rights “are not for sale,” and so the very
attempt to talking in terms of numbers is seen as a kind of professional, or even
moral, betrayal.2 But increasingly lawyers too acknowledge that governmental
policies must involve some accounting for their downsides. Cost-Beneft Analysis
(CBA) is a term used for a range of ideas and techniques on how to conduct this
balancing. At its simplest, CBA is the view that public regulation of risk of harm
should be based on an assessment of the expected harms and weighed against
1.

2.

See Emily Bazelon, “Restarting America Means People Will Die: So When Do We
Do It?,” Te New York Times (10 April 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/04/10/
magazine/coronavirus-economy-debate.html>; cf R v Michaud, 2015 ONCA 585 at paras
91-92 [Michaud].
For one book-length example of this attitude see Alain Supiot, Governance by Numbers: Te
Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance, translated by Saskia Brown (Hart, 2017).
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the costs of eliminating those risks. Risk-reducing actions should continue up
to the point that the marginal cost of reducing the risk exceeds the expected
gain from action.
Tis brief formulation may seem simple, and may strike some as obvious,
but it remains controversial in theory and incredibly difcult to implement in
practice. At the abstract level, some consider CBA an immoral approach that
exhibits insufcient respect to human life and for everything else that is of real
value.3 Even setting aside such worries, trying to implement CBA raises a host
of questions on what precisely should be weighed, who should do the weighing,
how to measure certain losses and benefts, what weight (if any) should be given
to distributive considerations, and many others.
Te COVID-19 outbreak provides an opportunity to examine some of the
questions surrounding CBA with a case study of governmental policies that
afected billions of people the world over. In the context of the lockdown policies,
CBA asks that we evaluate whether the costs of these policies in terms of the
social and economic dislocation they cause are worth the benefts in terms of
lives saved and other possible benefts. Tis may seem obvious as it is generally
uncontroversial that given a certain budget, one should aim for the biggest
bang for the buck. Likewise, given a limited choice between several courses of
action (or inaction), it makes sense to opt for the (in)action that will minimize
the losses and maximize the benefts. To use an analogy to a now-famous
thought experiment, one may think of the budget as the railway in the trolley
problem: It sets absolute limits on the decision maker’s available options with a
bad consequence occurring whichever option is taken. In such circumstances,
most people think that one should choose the track that leads to fewer deaths.4
Similarly, CBA urges us to choose the least bad option.
But CBA is not quite analogical to the trolley problem, as it requires making
judgments that many fnd counterintuitive and even outright immoral. For
example, unlike the trolley problem that directly asks us to compare lives with
lives, the costs and benefts involved with the lockdown policies are of diferent
kinds. Tis requires creating some common currency to compare them. Tis in
turn requires putting a price on life, and even less intuitively, implies that some

3.
4.

See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, “Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Beneft Analysis of
Environmental Protection” (2002) 150 U Pa L Rev 1553; Steven Kelman, “Cost-Beneft
Analysis: An Ethical Critique,” Reg (January-February 1981) 33.
See Marc D Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and
Wrong (HarperCollins, 2006) at 127-28.
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lives may not be worth saving. Standard CBA thus denies that saving lives, and
preventing harm, enjoys some lexical priority over other societal goals.5
Tese questions are signifcant for policymakers and lawyers, as many
areas of law deal, directly or indirectly, with preventing harms. Increasingly, the
law requires evaluating the costs involved in doing so in quite explicit terms.
Regulatory policy guidelines published by the Canadian government’s call for
“evidence-based” rule making based on “robust analysis of costs and benefts,
and the assessment of risk.”6 On a few occasions, Canadian courts have similarly
acknowledged the need for some kind of balancing of costs against benefts,
in both public and private law.7
Despite all this, CBA has received surprisingly little attention from Canadian
legal academics.8 Tis short essay focuses on the diferent responses taken around
5.

6.

7.

8.

For a critique of CBA on these grounds see Gregory C Keating, “Principles of Risk
Imposition and the Priority of Avoiding Harm” (2018) 36 Revus 1; see also Cass R Sunstein,
Te Cost–Beneft Revolution (MIT Press, 2018) at 27 (reporting on a survey showing that
many disagree with CBA for related reasons).
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Cabinet Directive on Regulation,” ss 3.0, 5.2.1,
online: <canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/federal-regulatory-management/
guidelines-tools/cabinet-directive-regulation.html#toc3>; see also Treasury Board of Canada
Secretariat, Canada Cost-Beneft Analysis Guide: Regulatory Proposals (President of the Treasury
Board, 2007) online (pdf ): <tbs-sct.gc.ca/rtrap-parfa/analys/analys-eng.pdf>.
See e.g. Michaud, supra note 1 at para 95 (“Te balancing of costs and benefts is in the
very nature of regulatory design and its main challenge”). Te question of judicial review of
regulation for failure to meet CBA requirement received relatively little judicial attention
in Canada. For one short discussion see Quebec (AG) v Canada (National Energy Board),
[1994] 1 SCR 159 at 178-81. In private law, the need to balance costs against benefts
has also been recognized in determining the standard of care in negligence. See Ryan v
Victoria (City), [1999] 1 SCR 201 at para 28; cf Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd,
[1946] 2 All ER 333 (CA) (“if all the trains in this country were restricted to a speed of fve
miles an hour, there would be fewer accidents, but our national life would be intolerably
slowed down” at 336).
One rare exception, focused on environmental law, is Heather McLeod-Kilmurray & Gavin
Smith, “Unsustainable Development in Canada: Environmental Assessment, Cost–Beneft
Analysis, and Environmental Justice in the Tar Sands” (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 65 at
83-91. Te paucity of discussion is especially striking when compared with the interest in the
topic by American legal academics. For an imprecise but instructive comparison, I searched
Heinonline, the most comprehensive database of law journals, for articles with “cost-beneft
analysis” in their title. Limiting the search to the United States yielded over 250 results.
A similar search in Canadian publications yielded only two results (one from 1970, the other
from 1986). (Te article cited in this note comes from a journal that is not in the database.)
Both were brief and did not touch on the foundational issues surrounding CBA. Even
accounting for the diference in population size (and correspondingly the size of the legal
academy), this is a signifcant diference.
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the world to the COVID-19 outbreak. As such, it cannot address many of the
questions pertaining to CBA that have been canvassed in the vast literature
surrounding it. Nevertheless, I hope it will spur interest beyond its particular
subject matter on the need for a more open discussion of CBA in the Canadian
regulatory context.
I begin this article by briefy considering some competitors to CBA that the
pandemic has challenged. Of those, perhaps the most notable is how little weight
individual rights seem to have had in discussions over the shutdown policies.
Instead, discussion was dominated by attempts to evaluate the costs and benefts
of diferent policies aimed at slowing the spread of the virus. While this may at
frst look like a victory for CBA, Part II argues that the pandemic also highlighted
some serious difculties with it, especially given the level of uncertainty against
which decisions had to be made. Rather than CBA, diferent countries adopted
one of several strategies, all acknowledging the need to balance costs against
benefts but without any real attempt at a precise calculation. Part III describes
three such strategies and argues that the choice of strategy was, partly at least,
grounded in political ideas, including rights. Tose could be incorporated within
CBA (broadly conceived), but they also show the limits of this method. Finally,
in Part IV, I draw some tentative conclusions about the longer-term implications
of the pandemic and responses to it for future regulatory decision making in
welfare states.

I. IDEAS THAT TOOK A HIT
I mentioned at the outset that the debate over the lockdown policies has been
couched in the language of tradeofs. Tat in itself is remarkable, because it means
it was not couched in the language of rights. Te lockdown policies constituted
a direct, savage blow to an activity that only a few months ago everyone would
have considered to be among our most basic rights: to wander around freely
in the streets. Perhaps even more signifcant have been the severe restrictions
imposed on people’s use of their property, especially with respect to orders to
shut down “non-essential” businesses. Tese policies, which were adopted with
relatively little public protest, are a challenge to those who advance rights-based
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views of private law, where “the nub of a property right is that the owner rather
than others gets to determine how the thing will be used.”9
It is not that the language of rights has been completely absent—there were
defnitely those who invoked it to object to various restrictions or requirements
(like the wearing of protective masks)—but these voices were completely
drowned out by the demand that we stay at home for the sake of the greater good,
or, paternalistically, for individuals’ own good. Tose who invoked individual
rights, which they claimed restricted government powers, were widely seen not
as civil libertarian heroes but as selfsh cranks.10 If rights operate as “trumps”
of individual choice over general welfare,11 then the pandemic has not been a
good time for rights.
It was not just right-wing notions of individual freedom that were hurt by the
virus. Other non-consequentialist ideas voiced by more left-wing commentators
were also aficted. One is the idea of incommensurability, the view that goods
or values of diferent kinds cannot be compared with each other. As each life
is priceless, the protection of life must be outside any economic calculation.12
Another, related, idea is the lexical ordering of values, according to which the
protection of life and the prevention of harm are prior to other lower-ranked
values, and therefore cannot be traded of with them. In an essay entitled “Making
Life Cheap,” one commentator called CBA “straightforwardly eliminationist,”
and described it as follows:
Since the value of a human life can be quantifed—at $9 million to $10 million,
according to major federal agencies—death is acceptable, and lives expendable, when
more valuable goods are involved. Te coronavirus pandemic has breathed new life

9.

Arthur Ripstein, “Possession and Use,” in James Penner & Henry E Smith, eds, Philosophical
Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 156 at 160, 162 [emphasis in
original]. Ripstein concedes (ibid at 160) that the right is subject to “public law limitations,”
but what he refers to does not include the limits imposed during the pandemic.
10. See e.g. Chris Herhalt, “Woman Roasted on Social Media after Refusing to Wear
Mask in Toronto Hospital,” CTV News (6 July 2020), online: <toronto.ctvnews.
ca/woman-roasted-on-social-media-after-refusing-to-wear-mask-in-torontohospital-1.5012036>.
11. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985) at 359. For an
application of such ideas to pandemics see Janet E Mosher, “Accessing Justice amid Treats
of Contagion” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 919 (there need to be “clear and convincing
evidence that [a] person whose rights are to be curtailed is infected with a contagious disease
… and poses a demonstrable threat to others” at 932).
12. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 3 at 1562-63, 1564; Keating, supra note 5.

PRIEL, COVID-19: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND POLITICS 543

into this old utilitarian chestnut, and it is precisely the life-reducing mindset of costbeneft analysis that has driven the resistance to social distancing.13

Te overheated language cannot hide the weakness of the argument.
No society has ever treated life as priceless (although by most measures human
life is better protected today than at any time in history).14 And it is actually
CBA that encourages various forms of social distancing as a cost-efective way
of saving lives.15 It is also wrong to suggest that the pandemic has revived a dead
idea, as CBA has been in use for decades, as it matches everyday moral practices
that show that humans do not treat life as priceless. All human societies around
the world permit, and often encourage, the private ownership and operation of
motor vehicles, even though this results in a staggering, and entirely foreseeable,
cost to life and limb. While it is an interesting question whether the private
ownership of cars would have survived CBA, it is actually individual rights
discourse that makes car ownership a matter of “personal choice” that is beyond
government regulation.16
CBA of government risk regulation is a method that seeks to rationalize
government action in order to achieve optimal risk reduction. CBA recognizes
that all human activity—and what common-sense morality tends to forget, also
human inactivity—carries with it the risk of injury and death. Even if societies
decided to spend all their available funds on saving lives (something that no
society has ever attempted), what specifc actions should be taken to save most
lives would remain an open question. And since opportunity costs are costs, even
in such a scenario CBA would be inescapable. Terefore, properly understood,
subjecting lockdown policies to CBA is not “a choice between lives and dollars.”17
Te dollars are used by people, and when they do not have them—when “the
economy” falters—people are hurt. Te contrast is based on a natural but fallacious
tendency to weigh immediate outcomes that are the result of a direct causal path
and ignore other outcomes whose causal paths are less obvious but no less real.

13. Aaron Timms, “Making Life Cheap,” Te New Republic (June 2020) 38 at 38, 40. Te fgures
mentioned refer to value of a “statistical life,” which is currently measured at about nine
million USD. For a discussion see text accompanying note 39 below.
14. See generally Steven Pinker, Te Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
(Penguin, 2011) at chs 1-4.
15. See e.g. Chris Barrett et al, “Economic and Social Impact of Infuenza Mitigation Strategies
by Demographic Class” (2011) 3 Epidemics 19.
16. Cf Sarah A Seo, “Te New Public” (2016) 125 Yale LJ 1616 at 1649-55 (recounting the
characterization of driving as freedom from government intervention).
17. Timms, supra note 13 at 40.
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II. THE TRIUMPH OF CBA?
A. CBA WITH MASSIVE UNCERTAINTY

Can we conclude from the preceding discussion, however truncated and brief,
that the pandemic has fnally shown that CBA is, as one commentator put it
a few years ago, the “only game in town”?18 Alas, it turns out that matters are
not quite so simple. While the idea behind CBA is sound, in practice CBA is
valuable only if it rests on good data. Otherwise, it is potentially worse than
useless, as it can create the impression of a precise numerical (and as such,
apolitical) guide to action which available knowledge does not in fact warrant.
Even if the pandemic has been a victory of sorts for consequentialism, it has also
provided an instructive case study of the problems with CBA in circumstances
of great uncertainty.
Of course, this problem has been recognized before in other contexts, but
defenders of CBA have tended to minimize its scope. For example, Cass Sunstein,
who is an eager advocate of CBA, has written that cases where agencies “may be
operating under circumstances of ignorance, in which they cannot specify either
outcomes or probabilities” are “rare.”19 If by this Sunstein meant cases where
regulators are required to make a decision based on no information at all, then
the phenomenon is indeed rare. But cases of signifcant uncertainty are quite
common. For example, in debates in the United States over the death penalty,
some have argued that empirical evidence shows it provides a powerful deterrent,
and as such it “saves” many lives. Others, however, have shown how sensitive
these fndings are to small changes in the models.20 It takes only a slight change
to them to fnd that the death penalty increases the prevalence of murder.21
18. Barbara H Fried, “Te Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts” (2012) 18 Legal
Teory 231 at 231.
19. Cass R Sunstein, “Te Limits of Quantifcation” (2014) 102 Calif L Rev 1369 at 1380,
1386. But cf Cass R Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harvard University Press, 2007) at 163
(“at least a degree of uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot be assigned with specifed
bands, is not so rare”).
20. See John J Donohue & Justin Wolfers, “Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death
Penalty Debate” (2005) 58 Stan L Rev 791 [Donohue & Wolfers, “Uses”]; John J Donohue,
III & Justin Wolfers, “Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder” (2009) 11
Am L & Econ Rev 249.
21. See Donohue & Wolfers, “Uses,” supra note 20 at 825-26. Incidentally, one of the targets of
this article was Sunstein, who relying on earlier empirical studies, has argued in support of
the death penalty. See ibid at 825. Another study, more pertinent for present purposes, has
delved into the costs and benefts of a single environmental regulation, again showing some
of the uncertainties involved, is Tomas O McGarity, “Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math”
(2002) 90 Geo LJ 2341.
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Te difculties with evaluating the costs and benefts of lockdown policies
in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak far outweigh the difculties with
assessing the deterrent efect of the death penalty. In the death penalty studies,
the relevant data are available and the biggest difculty is isolating the impact
of the death penalty from other societal changes that infuence the prevalence
of murder. Tis is difcult enough, but it is nothing compared to the levels of
uncertainty decision makers are facing in the present pandemic.
Starting with the benefts of the lockdown policies, the most obvious one is
saved lives. To know just how many lives have been saved by shutdown policies,
one needs to know how many would have died without them. Tis is difcult,
as there are signifcant diferences in estimates of the infection rate and the
infection fatality rate of the SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.
For reasons that are as yet not entirely clear, these rates have been dramatically
diferent for diferent countries, and often also for diferent regions within one
country, or within one country at diferent times. Even something as seemingly
simple as the number of people who died from the virus—supposedly a matter
of mere counting—is not quite certain, even though such a number is crucial for
being able to evaluate the infectiousness of the virus. Calculations based on excess
mortality suggest COVID-19 may be more lethal than ofcial mortality counts
say; but excess mortality calculations themselves may be inaccurate, as they may
refect deaths of people deciding to forgo treatment for other conditions.22 If such
a choice is the result of the lockdown policies, these deaths may be attributed
not to the virus but to the governmental response to it. On all these matters,
our knowledge constantly improves, but it must be remembered that signifcant
uncertainty remains and that initial decisions on lockdown had to be made
against far higher levels of uncertainty.
Some attempts to calculate the costs and benefts of the lockdown included
only saved lives as a beneft. But though the most signifcant beneft, it is not
the only one. Another signifcant beneft of non-infection due to isolation is
the saving from avoided infections for those who recover. Tis, of course, was
always a beneft, but it assumes greater relevance as time goes by since mortality
rates for those infected seem to have gone down quite dramatically across all age
groups.23 Whatever the reasons, this means that the benefts of lockdown are
22. See Denis Grady, “Te Pandemic’s Hidden Victims: Sick or Dying, but Not from the
Virus,” Te New York Times (14 May 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/04/20/health/
treatment-delays-coronavirus.html>.
23. See Heidi Ledford, “Why Do COVID Death Rates Seem to Be Falling?,” (2020)
587 Nature 190.
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lower, but it must be remembered that one of the reasons for this improvement
is that those infected today often get to less overwhelmed hospitals, because
of the institution of lockdown policies. Another reason is that those infected
today have the beneft of better treatment protocols than those infected in the
early months of the pandemic. Avoiding these often-costly treatments is still a
signifcant beneft from non-infection, i.e. from lockdown. Avoided infections
also prevent the potential economic efects of an infected person’s inability to
work, which may extend to others, even if not themselves infected but who need
to isolate. (To be sure, the lockdown itself may limit one’s ability to work, but
workplace adjustments have at least partially addressed this; someone ill may not
be able to work, and had there been no lockdown fewer of these alternatives may
have been developed.)
Further benefts from non-infection for those who without lockdown would
have become ill and recovered are even more difcult to assess at this point. Chief
among them are the long-term health efects of the virus: What was initially
thought to be a virulent respiratory disease is now coming to be seen as an illness
that aficts some patients’ hearts, kidneys, and even their brains.24 How frequent
these efects are among those who recover, how serious they are, and especially
how long they last are all at this stage largely unknown and may not be fully
known for years. In addition to the savings from avoided infections, on the side
of the benefts one has to include the signifcant improvement in air quality
in many cities, as well as the decline in trafc and other accidents (following a
decline in economic activity).25 Tough many of these changes are temporary,
some of this beneft may prove long lasting: Lockdown policy have had a
disruptive efects on many workplace practices, which some predict will outlast

24. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Coronavirus Autopsies: A Story of 38 Brains, 87 Lungs and 42
Hearts,” Te Washington Post (1 July 2020), online: <washingtonpost.com/health/2020/
07/01/coronavirus-autopsies-fndings>; Pam Belluck, “Here’s What Recovery from Covid-19
Looks Like for Many Survivors,” Te New York Times (1 July 2020), online: <nytimes.
com/2020/07/01/health/coronavirus-recovery-survivors.html>; Ed Yong, “Long-Haulers
Are Redefning covid-19,” Te Atlantic (19 August 2020), online: <theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2020/08/long-haulers-covid-19-recognition-support-groups-symptoms/615382/>.
25. See Farhad Manjoo, “I have Seen the Future Without Cars, and It’s Amazing,” Te
New York Times (9 July 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/sunday/
ban-cars-manhattan-cities.html>; Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Deaths of Despair and the
Future of Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2020) at 26, 141-42 (mortality rates go
down during recessions).
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the pandemic.26 If fewer people commute daily to work, if there is less business
travel, one consequence of the pandemic may be long-term improvement in
the environment.
On the side of costs, the most evident and immediate efect of the lockdown
has been a massive economic slowdown. Unemployment in Canada jumped
from 5.6 per cent prior to the pandemic to 13.7 per cent in May 2020 with entire
industries (hospitality, entertainment, brick-and-mortar retail, among others)
coming to an almost complete stop in activity. Tough the government has been
providing support for small businesses, it did not fully ofset the losses, and data
begin to suggest rise in bankruptcies, with the worst yet to come.27 Longer term
efects of the lockdown policies are less clear, but past experience suggests that
major economic shocks have long-term efects on the employment and earning
prospects of those who are entering the labour market during (or in the aftermath
of ) the shock.28 In addition, there have already been reports of higher incidence of
domestic abuse, mental health problems, and suicide as a result of the economic
dislocation, isolation, and confnement following the shutdown policies.29 (To
add to the complexity, to accurately measure the efect of government isolation
policies, one has to exclude from the calculation behavioural changes that would
have happened spontaneously.)
Another likely cost from the current crisis involves the signifcant debts
governments incur to deal with increased expenditures and reduced revenue.
In all likelihood these debts will be paid of, at least in part, from future budget
26. See Clive Tompson, “What If Work from Home Goes On…Forever?,” Te New
York Times (9 June 2020), online: <nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/09/magazine/
remote-work-covid.html>.
27. See Pete Evans, “As Covid-19 Relief Programs Wind Down, Bankruptcies Are
Starting to Spike Again,” CBC (15 November 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/business/
insolvency-bankruptcy-covid-1.5798319>; see also Pat Foran, “More than Half of Canadian
Restaurants May Close Permanently Within Months, Survey Finds,” CTV News (28 August
2020), online: <toronto.ctvnews.ca/more-than-half-of-canadian-restaurants-may-closepermanently-within-months-survey-fnds-1.5083961>.
28. See Eduardo Porter & David Yafe-Bellany, “Facing Adulthood with an Economic Disaster’s
Lasting Scars,” Te New York Times (19 May 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/05/19/
business/economy/coronavirus-young-old.html>.
29. See Jennifer Koshan, Janet Mosher & Wanda Wiegers, “COVID-19, the Shadow Pandemic,
and Access to Justice for Survivors of Domestic Violence” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 739;
see also Sebastian Payne, “Coronavirus: Te Hidden Health Costs of the UK Lockdown,”
Te Financial Times (26 April 2020), online: <ft.com/content/0ccaac50-854c-11eab555-37a289098206>; Cec Haire, “Increase in Domestic Violence Calls Persists Troughout
the Pandemic, Says Non-Proft,” CBC News (2 July 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/
newfoundland-labrador/violence-prevention-east-val-barter-domestic-covid-1.5632993>.
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cuts to various governmental programs. If history is our guide, it is safe to assume
that such cuts will disproportionately hurt low-income individuals. To the extent
that distributive considerations are relevant for CBA—and there are good reasons
to think that they do—this is another likely cost of current policies, but whose
magnitude it is very difcult at this stage to estimate.
With the efects of the shutdown discussed so far, one could place them on
the side of costs or benefts with relative confdence. For other possible efects
of the current pandemic, beyond estimating what will happen, it is difcult to
know their overall valence. For instance, the lockdown policies forced many
workplaces to switch quickly to remote work. Tis generated many immediate
costs, but those may spur long-needed, benefcial changes to work practices.30
Several employers have indicated that they now plan to expand work-from-home
practices, citing savings related to the acquisition and maintenance of expensive
real estate and, more surprisingly, increased productivity. If such changes prove
lasting, would the positives (e.g., more leisure time and less anxiety from avoided
commutes to work, less pollution from reduced trafc) outweigh the negatives
(e.g., less sociability)?
In assessing the costs and benefts of the pandemic, one signifcant unknown
is the time it will take before life returns to something resembling its pre-pandemic
form. Tis partly depends on how long it will take to develop a vaccine or an
efective treatment for the virus. While the distribution of vaccines has begun,
it will be months before they are widely available. Worryingly, there are also
discouraging indications that a vaccine may provide only temporary or limited
protection. In these circumstances, even small changes can have signifcant efects
on our ability to return to engaging in the same social interactions known from
before the pandemic. By then, some changes initially thought to be temporary
may become permanent.
Even more signifcant changes may come about as a result of the pandemic,
but these are even more difcult to predict and assess. Historians have argued
that some pandemics have brought with them epoch-making change: Te
bubonic plague that killed between one-third to one-half of Europe’s population
in the middle of the fourteenth century is cited as an important factor in bringing
about the end of feudalism, the beginning of the Renaissance and the emergence
of capitalism; the 1918 pandemic is sometimes mentioned as bolstering the
case for expanding the franchise to women. Closer to lawyers’ concern, the very
30. For the suggestion that the court system may take advantage of pandemic to efect signifcant
reform see Suzanne E Chiodo, “Ontario Civil Justice Reform in the Wake of COVID-19:
Inspired or Institutionalized?” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 801.
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justifcation for government regulation of public health that many now take for
granted may have been born in reaction to the Black Death. In a book dedicated
to the social efects of pandemics, Frank Snowden wrote that “[p]lague regulations
… cast a long shadow over political history. Tey marked a vast extension of
state power into spheres of human life that had never before been subject to
political authority. … Te campaign against plague … promoted an accretion of
the power and legitimation of the modern state.”31
It is possible that the current pandemic will have a similar impact. Before
the pandemic, there were serious concerns over the vast amounts of personal data
now held by tech companies and governments. In many countries the pandemic
has led to the adoption of privacy-intruding policies, now possible with the use of
digital technologies. Will people be willing to cast aside their worries over privacy
for the sake of public health and a return to “normal life”? A news report on
China noted that its government has “long sought to harness vast troves of digital
information to their sprawling, sometimes unruly nation more efciently.”32
Following the adage that one should not let a crisis go to waste, will China and
other countries take advantage of this pandemic to expand the reach of such
policies? If such changes do happen, should they be included in a CBA of the
efects of government policies? And if so, how?33
B. MODELS AND THEIR LIMITS

Scientists face uncertainty all the time. Tis does not mean that they cannot make
successful predictions. Teir main tool for dealing with uncertainty is models.
Models are tools for better understanding reality by way of creating a simplifed
representations of it.34 At times, the point of the simplifcation is to highlight
certain aspects of reality, at others it is to make explanations and predictions more
tractable, at still others it is to deal with gaps in available data. Terefore, that a
31. Frank M Snowden, Epidemics and Society: From the Black Death to the Present (Yale University
Press, 2019) at 81-82; see also Mitchell L Hammond, Epidemics and the Modern World
(University of Toronto Press, 2020) at 38-39.
32. See Raymond Zhong, “China’s Virus Apps May Outlast the Outbreak, Stirring Privacy
Fears,” Te New York Times (26 May 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/05/26/technology/
china-coronavirus-surveillance.html>.
33. One could be even more speculative: Before the outbreak, many forecasters predicted
President Donald Trump would win re-election because the US economy was doing well.
Trump’s disastrous response to the pandemic and its efect on the American economy are
now seen as one of the factors that have led to his loss. Should one count this as a beneft
of the pandemic?
34. Tis in itself is a simplifcation, as models sometimes serve other functions. For a discussion
see Tarja Knuuttila, “Models, Representation, and Mediation” (2004) 72 Phil Sci 1260.
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model leaves out certain aspects of reality—i.e., that strictly speaking, it is false—
is not necessarily a problem with it.
By the same token, it is not enough to say that simply because scientists use
models, uncertainty is not an issue. Not all models, and not all uncertainties,
are created equal.35 In the present context, early models have reached widely
divergent conclusions on the wisdom of various policies.36 For example, a group
of economists concluded that lockdown policies were justifed by comparing
the value of saved lives with the economic costs of such policies and concluded
that the former outweighs the latter: Te estimated savings from the lockdown
policies were valued at 12.4 trillion USD, which was deemed much greater than
the estimated GDP losses to the United States economy, estimated at 7.21 trillion
USD.37 As the model only calculated the benefts from saved lives against the
cost as measured by decline in GDP, it excluded many of the costs and benefts
mentioned above. By contrast, an epidemiologist, questioned lockdown policies
by arguing that they were rushed and possibly infated the harm caused by the
illness (i.e., the benefts from government policies).38
Some of the diferences related to questions of model design (e.g., what costs
and benefts are included in the calculation) and empirical questions (e.g., how
many people will die in the absence of lockdown policies), which are matters
on which we can expect models to improve as better data are available, some of
35. Cf Daniel A Farber, “Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science”
(2008) 86 Tex L Rev 1655 (explaining why climate models predicting global warming are
superior to economic models of the economic impact of climate change).
36. See Martin Enserink & Kai Kupferschmidt, “Mathematics of Life and Death: How
Disease Models Shape National Shutdowns and Other Pandemic Policies,” Science
(25 March 2020), online: <sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/mathematics-life-and-deathhow-disease-models-shape-national-shutdowns-and-other>; Fareed Zakaria, “Why
the Coronavirus Models Aren’t Totally Accurate,” Te Washington Post (9 April 2020),
online: <washingtonpost.com/opinions/without-mass-testing-were-fying-blind-throughthis-crisis/2020/04/09/bf61e178-7a9b-11ea-a130-df573469f094_story.html>; Joel
Achenbach, “‘Tell Me What to Do! Please!’: Even Experts Struggle with Coronavirus
Unknowns,” Te Washington Post (26 May 2020), online: <washingtonpost.com/health/
tell-me-what-to-do-please-even-experts-struggle-with-coronavirus-unknowns/2020/05/25/
e11f9870-9d08-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html>.
37. See Linda Tunström et al, “Te Benefts and Costs of Using Social Distancing to Flatten
the Curve for COVID-19” (2020) 11 J Beneft-Cost Analysis 179. Te calculation for
the beneft was an estimate of 1.24 million lives saved times 10 million USD per saved
statistical life.
38. John PA Ioannidis, “A Fiasco in the Making? As the Coronavirus Pandemic Takes Hold,
We Are Making Decisions Without Reliable Data,” Stat (17 March 2020), online: <www.
statnews.com/2020/03/17/a-fasco-in-the-making-as-the-coronavirus-pandemic-takes-holdwe-are-making-decisions-without-reliable-data>.
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the diferences are due to normative judgments. Here is one: what is the beneft
accrued from a saved life? Setting aside ethical qualms about any attempt to
answer such a question in terms of dollars and cents, one fnds in the relevant
literature two diferent approaches that in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic may lead to very diferent conclusions. One approach uses the measure
of “value of statistical life” (VSL) to measure the value of each life saved. Tough
there is no uniform measure for VSL, it is currently typically measured at about
nine to ten million US dollars. Te other approach, known as “Quality Adjusted
Life Years” (QALY), measures how many years a regulatory intervention will add,
and further weighs “healthy” years more than others.39 Te latter approach thus
treats the benefts from saving the life of an older person as lower than that of a
young person, as the former has fewer years left to live, and those are typically of
“lower” quality.
People of all age groups have died of COVID-19, but the distribution of
fatalities has been very heavily skewed toward older people: In Canada, 96 per
cent of those who died of COVID-19 were sixty years old or older.40 In addition,
those who died tended to be people with several comorbidities, i.e. people
who even before the outbreak were less healthy.41 One reason for the diferent
conclusions of the two studies mentioned above is that the former used the VSL
approach, whereas the latter took the age and health of most decedents into

39. Tese are not the only ones. For a discussion of these approaches and a proposal of yet
another one see Sean Hannon Williams, “Statistical Children” (2013) 30 Yale J on Reg 63
(arguing for VSL with an added “child premium”). Te text ignores many complications
related to these two competing approaches. On some of them see Sunstein, supra
note 5 at ch 3.
40. See Sharon Kirbey, “In Canada, the Cases of COVID-19 and Deaths are Declining. Here’s
the Story Behind the Numbers,” National Post (11 July 2020), online: <nationalpost.
com/news/in-canada-the-cases-of-covid-19-and-deaths-are-declining-heres-the-storybehind-the-numbers>.
41. Eighty-one per cent of deaths from COVID-19 in Canada were of long-term care residents.
See Canadian Institute of Health Information, Pandemic Experience in the Long-Term Care
Sector: How Does Canada Compare with Other Countries? (June 2020) at 2, online (pdf ):
CIHI Snapshot <www.cihi.ca/sites/default/fles/document/covid-19-rapid-response-longterm-care-snapshot-en.pdf>. According to a 2015 report, the average length of stay at a
long-term care facility in Ontario was 2.7 years (the median was 1.6 years). See Health
Analytics Branch, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Long-Term Care in Ontario:
Sector Review (September 2015) at 17, online (pdf ): <longtermcareinquiry.ca/wp-content/
uploads/Exhibit-169-Long-Term-Care-in-Ontario-Sector-overview.pdf>. While these fgures
do not account for the reason for the end of the stay, the two most common reasons for
discharge are a move to a hospital (46.9 percent) and death (30.6 per cent). See ibid at 16.
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account.42 Nothing in the CBA method itself answers the question which of
these approaches should be adopted, and our practices do not reveal a perfectly
consistent pattern. In some contexts, societies adopt something closer to the QALY
approach: When it comes to allocating organs for transplantation to potential
recipients, decision protocols give priority to younger and otherwise healthier
patients. At other times, we reject such calculations and refuse comparisons that
suggest some lives are worth more than others.
Tis point reveals a fundamental question about CBA that I have so far
ignored, namely that despite its proponents’ occasional claims to being engaged in
a purely “technocratic” calculation, it contains unavoidable normative questions.
Just how signifcant this component is, how devastating it is for CBA, is itself a
(politically) contested question. I do not know of anyone who denies that some of
the questions at the heart of CBA are not purely a matter of empirical calculation.
To critics of CBA, this undermines the entire aspiration of employing CBA as a
more rigorous (albeit potentially mistaken) method for assessing risk regulation.
Tey contend that CBA is just better at hiding its normative choices under a
veneer of false objectivity that comes with quantifcation.43 When this veneer is
scratched of, it becomes evident that many quantifcations that go into actual
CBA rest on dubious foundations that lack scientifc basis.44
Proponents of CBA acknowledge this and ofer two responses. One is that
there is still a meaningful distinction between scientifc and normative questions;
and they further argue that scientists should be in charge of the former. Tey
point out that a major reason why risk regulation is so wasteful and irrational is

42. Tis in itself may refect a disciplinary diference. VSL is common among economists, QALY
among health care professionals. See Williams, supra note 39 at 120. Tunström et al, supra
note 37, is the work of economists; Ioannides, supra note 38, was written by a medical doctor
and epidemiologist.
43. See Wendy E Wagner, “Te Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation” (1995) 95 Colum L
Rev 1613 at 1632-35, 1701-702; see also Cory Coglianese & Gary E Merchant, “Shifting
Sands: Te Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards” (2004) 152 U Pa L Rev 1255 at
1265, 1274, 1324.
44. For demonstrations of the non-scientifc, and often politically-motivated, assumptions that
have gone into specifc exercises in evaluating the costs and benefts of particular regulations
see McGarity, supra note 21 at 2356-65; Mark Kelman, “On Democracy-Bashing:
A Skeptical Look at the Teoretical and ‘Empirical’ Practice of the Public Choice Movement”
(1988) 74 Va L Rev 199 at 239-60.
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because it is often driven by unfounded popular fears.45 For example, no matter
how we measure the value of life, it is a matter of fact that terrorism poses a far
smaller risk of death than heart attacks, and that budgetary outlays should refect
this fact, even if most people fear the former more.
For some, however, this view amounts to undermining democracy: What
risks should be regulated and to what degree are political questions “all the way
down.” If people care or fear some risks more than others, their choices should be
respected. Tose who advance these views note that public attitudes about these
matters are typically correlated with standard political worldviews or ideologies:
for example, people with more egalitarians views tend to be more worried about
global warming; people with more hierarchical views tend to be more concerned
about drugs and want them to be more heavily regulated.46 To make risk experts
decide how much to spend on diferent risks is to remove from democratic debate
questions that have always been considered the core of public discourse. Indeed,
for some of these defenders of regulatory democracy, the presentation of popular
opinions on risk as “errors” is itself mistaken. People’s attitudes to risk refect
certain identifable patterns. For instance, the risk of a single event (a “disaster”)
leading to thousand deaths is considered worse than a similar risk leading to a
similar number of deaths, when those are scattered over time; deaths perceived
as involuntary or in circumstances of lack of control are perceived as worse than
deaths in more “voluntary” circumstances; and “dread factor” makes some kinds
of death (e.g., from a nuclear accident) be considered worse than others. For
some, this does not show that people are irrational, but that, as psychologist Paul
Slovic put it, people’s “conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of the
experts and refects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert
risk assessments.”47
Tis approach has led some to challenge the expert-led approach to risk
regulation as fundamentally anti-democratic. But the argument is overdrawn.
Tere are truths about risks, and usually experts know those better than most
people. In making policy decisions on COVID-19, epidemiologists’ views on
45. See e.g. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Efective Risk Regulation (Harvard
University Press, 1993) at 59-63; Cass R Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary
Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 126-28. Tis view also assumes,
controversially, that experts are better than lay people at insulating themselves from cognitive
biases. I cannot deal with this question here.
46. See e.g. Dan M Kahan et al, “Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk”
(2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1071 at 1083-87.
47. Paul Slovic, “Perception of Risk” (1987) 236 Sci 280 at 285. For drawing out the regulatory
implications of this view see Kahan et al, supra note 46.
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the risks involved should count more than the views of peddlers of conspiracy
theories.48 Tis is in fact a familiar feature of modern democracy. What
percentage of the defence budget should be allocated for jet fghters as opposed
to submarines, tanks, or cyberwarfare, is not a question decided by “the people,”
nor is it typically decided by their representatives; it is a question decided by
experts. Te same is true of most public health decisions, such as whether to
purchase another fMRI machine or to hire more doctors (at the hospital level),
or how much to allocate to education for healthier eating over cancer research (at
the health-care system level). Te reason is simple: Most people know nothing,
or less than nothing, about these matters. Te amount of misinformation about
COVID-19 has been signifcant, with numerous unfounded claims about its
origins, its risks, or of reliable methods for dealing with it. For all its uncertainty,
scientifc expertise on matters of public health is not just “one perspective” that
is no better than any other, and there is already quite clear evidence that those
places that followed well-established public health procedures have done better
than those that have not.49
It is true, however, that the scope of decisions allocated to experts is itself a
politically contested question, and one on which diferent countries take diferent
approaches, refecting diferent ways of subjecting CBA to democracy. Against
this, a second response to the democratic defcit of CBA works by expanding
what is included in the technocratic calculation of costs and benefts, thereby
turning at least some normative questions into empirical ones. In a way, this
approach tries to calculate democracy into the CBA. Te democratic approach
to risk regulation considered earlier, treats regulatory decisions based on fear as
valid even if the fear is not grounded in facts, as long as the fear refects people’s
genuine choices. By contrast, the technocratic response contends that an accurate
calculation of costs and benefts must include the welfare costs that come from
fear.50 A regulatory decision that will mitigate fear will generate benefts even
48. Tose are more common than one would like to think. See Dominik Stecula, Mark Pickup
& Clifton van der Linden, “A Survey of Canadians Shows a Worrying Number of Believers
More Likely to Ignore Recommended Health Behaviours. Te Consequences Could Be
Devastating,” Policy Options (6 July 2020), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/
july-2020/who-believes-in-covid-19-conspiracies-and-why-it-matters> (reporting on a
poll that found that as many as 25 per cent of Canadians have some belief in at least one
conspiracy theory about covid-19).
49. See e.g. Charles Duhigg, “Seattle’s Leaders Let Scientists Take the Lead. New York’s Did
Not,” Te New Yorker (26 April 2020), online: <newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/04/
seattles-leaders-let-scientists-take-the-lead-new-yorks-did-not>.
50. See Matthew D Adler, “Fear Assessment: Cost-Beneft Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and
Anxiety” (2004) 79 Chi-Kent L Rev 977.
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if the fear itself has no basis in reality. If accepted, it is difcult to limit this
idea to one emotion. One’s disappointment from the lack of protection for
what one values is a cost that should be included: Te opponent of abortion
sufers a welfare loss from knowing that abortions are being legally performed;
and the opponent of animal farming sufers a loss from knowing it is allowed,
even if she is a vegetarian. Sunstein, who in the past favoured allocating risk
regulation decisions to experts because they are better informed than the people,
has more recently also argued that upset over such disappointed beliefs should be
included in CBA.51
While the attempt to minimize the scope of politics in CBA may be
admirable, this proposal is problematic. If this is to be done, many of the popular
errors to be excluded from CBA will be brought back in into the calculation, only
in diferent guise: People’s erroneous views should not determine which risks to
regulate; that remains a matter for experts. But experts will now be required to
also include the costs accruing from people’s disappointments of their errors not
becoming law. In other words, whereas the “democratic” approach extends the
domain of politics when it comes to who should make the decision, the expert-led
“technocratic” approach may end up looking quite similar if it includes political
preferences in determining what the costs and benefts are.52 It is odd to propose
CBA as a means of avoiding errors in regulatory decisions, only to bring those
errors back into the fold in a diferent way.
Furthermore, rather than improving CBA, such suggestions will make CBA
calculations even more difcult to calculate, and consequently make the CBA
process much more prone to political manipulation, a technique that could
be used to justify any desired decision. Measurement problems are likely to be
considerable, especially if we try to separate disappointed moral attitudes from
factual errors, since in such matters empirical and normative beliefs are going
to be deeply intertwined: Tose who believe that some crimes deserve capital
punishment (and therefore disappointed by its absence), will also tend to believe
empirical evidence showing that it deters; those who believe that vaccinations
cause autism will typically also hold the moral view that vaccination is a personal

51. Compare Sunstein, supra note 45 at 126 with Sunstein, supra note 5 at 108-10.
52. An even greater difculty of separating the two arises if we classify (some) deontological
moral attitudes as cognitive biases. Should these be ignored in technocratic CBA? Cf Dan
Priel, “Do Societies Prioritize Harm Prevention?” (2019) 37 Revus 127 at 140-44.
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choice that is beyond the legitimate power of the state to mandate.53 Indeed,
a challenge to a mistaken factual belief (vaccinations are dangerous) may adversely
afect individual welfare no less than a challenge to a moral belief (vaccinations
are a matter of personal choice).
Te current pandemic illustrates this problem of separating factual errors
from moral beliefs, and further shows how the factual uncertainty discussed in
the previous section exacerbates it. Te greater is the factual uncertainty, the
more likely are factual estimates to be driven by—and perhaps also be presented
as—moral beliefs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who believe that the
risk of the virus is small tend also to think that masks do not prevent the spread
of the virus (even though the two beliefs are completely independent of each
other), and also hold the moral view that the state cannot force individuals to
wear masks.54 Even if we dismiss their factual views as erroneous, they may come
back into the calculation in the form of their moral beliefs.
To conclude, politics may enter CBA in at least three places: when deciding
a questions like how to measure the value of life; when disappointed political
beliefs are taken into account in determining the costs of a regulation; and when
in circumstances of factual uncertainty political attitudes fll the gaps. Given the
levels of uncertainty surrounding COVID-19, especially when the decisions on
lockdown and shutdown were taken, the prospects of a reliable CBA are dim.

53. Cf Jeremy D Fraiberg & Michael J Trebilcock, “Risk Regulation: Technocratic and
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform” (1998) 43 McGill LJ 835 at 849-57. For
psychological studies illustrating the point mentioned in the text in experimental settings see
Charles G Lord, Less Ross & Mark R Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
Te Efects of Prior Teories on Subsequently Considered Evidence” (1979) 37 J Personality
& Soc Psychol 2098 (balanced evidence on the deterrent efect of capital punishment
was seen by both opponents and proponents as supporting their views and strengthened
both sides’ convictions); Peter H Ditto & David F Lopez, “Motivated Skepticism: Use
of Diferential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions” (1992)
63 J Personality & Soc Psychol 568. To make things worse, studies suggest that once
beliefs are formed, they tend to resist disconfrming information. See Lee Ross, Mark
R Lepper & Michael Hubbard, “Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception:
Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefng Paradigm” (1975) 32 J Personality &
Soc Psychol 880.
54. Cf Gaëlle Marinthe et al, “Looking Out for Myself: Exploring the Relationship Between
Conspiracy Mentality, Perceived Personal Risk, and COVID-19 Prevention Measures”
(2020) 25 Brit J Health Psychol 957. Tis kind of motivated reasoning is found in other
contexts. See Melissa Finucane et al, “Te Afect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and
Benefts” (2000) 13 J Behav Decision Making 1 (fnding a negative correlation between
perceived risk of an activity and perceived beneft).
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III. THREE STRATEGIES AND THE INESCAPABILITY OF
POLITICS
With scientifc modelling proving inconclusive, diferent countries settled on
diferent approaches. In a sufciently fne-grained comparison, each country
has tackled the problems arising from the pandemic somewhat diferently; but
zooming out from the details, we can identify several distinct approaches. One
approach focused on signifcant lockdown of the entire population and the
shutting down of many businesses as means for reducing the opportunities for
infection and thus the spread of the virus. A second approach has attempted to
continue with life as we know it on the assumption that in the long run this
approach will achieve similar epidemiological results but at a lower cost. A third
approach has focused on a very high volume of testing and tracing as a way of
quickly identifying and isolating those infected.55
In a loose sense we can think of these three approaches as models, ideal-types
that the actual approaches taken by diferent countries may resemble more or less
closely. All three models are broadly welfarist in orientation, and all assume the
state has a signifcant role to play in protecting individuals from various health
risks. My aim is not to call winners and losers. At the time of writing, many
countries are still struggling to contain the spread of the virus, in some cases
after declaring early victory only to face rising number of infections a few weeks
later. By contrast, some countries have seen very small number of infections for
reasons that are still not entirely clear.56 My aim instead is to show how the
diferent approaches refect awareness of the need to weigh costs against benefts,
but how difcult it is to adopt a purely expert-led approach, especially when
uncertainty is high.
Using very broad strokes, it is not difcult to present them in terms of CBA
with the impact of diferent decisions on health, economic activity, and privacy
55. Tese are not the only strategies. Another approach was adopted in New Zealand, which
efectively shut its borders. On this strategy see Michael G Baker et al, “New Zealand’s
Elimination Strategy for the covid-19 Pandemic and What Is Required to Make It Work”
(2020) 133:1512 NZ Med J 10. Tis strategy has so far proven successful in New Zealand,
but as the authors note, it is one that is easier to implement in an island country. Another
country I will largely leave out of the following discussion is the United States. Tough in
some respects it is closest to the frst strategy, it raises additional issues I cannot consider here.
56. See Hannah Beech, “No One Knows What Tailand Is Doing Right, but So Far, It’s
Working,” Te New York Times (16 July 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/07/16/world/
asia/coronavirus-thailand-photos.html> (Tailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos
all reporting very low rates of infection).
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assessed diferently. But this kind of “impressionistic CBA” can justify just about
any conclusion. As the discussion above stressed the infuence of politics on
CBA, I will attempt to put the three strategies within a political framework. One
of the upshots of this perspective is highlighting the limitations of the familiar
single-axis spectrum of left (pro-regulation) versus right (anti-regulation) as the
basis for analyzing the politics of risk regulation, as the diferent approaches
considered do not easily map onto it. Nor do the diferent models map neatly on
a spectrum of more or less democratic regimes: versions of the third strategy, for
instance, have been adopted by both.
1. Lockdown: Most western democracies have adopted shutdown as their
primary risk reduction strategy. In Canada, for example, it was around mid
March that in short order the diferent provinces declared a state of emergency,
which included orders for schools and many businesses to shut down, and that
the federal government severely restricted entry into the country.57 In addition,
in countries that adopted this approach, people were encouraged, and at times
required, to stay at home, to practice social distancing, and wear personal
protective equipment when outside. Te stated rationale for this approach has
been “fattening the curve.” While the phrase suggests just slowing the number
of cases while leaving the total number of infections similar (the fattened curve
is also wider), such policies are likely to lead to lower mortality: Spreading the
number of infections makes it easier for hospitals to manage new cases without
being overwhelmed; it also gives health practitioners the opportunity to learn
from experience and improve their treatment protocols so that those infected
later receive better care.
Tough the prolonged lockdown comes with heavy costs, including the
intrusion into certain rights, this approach refects relatively high concern for
privacy, which in turn refects a more-or-less conscious decision in the countries
that opted for this approach to forgo potentially better ways of tracking the
spread of the virus. I therefore call this approach “high security, high privacy.”
Tis approach is defnitely not libertarian—it mobilizes the power of the state
to actively promote and enforce health and economic security—but it still
sought to maintains some limits on government action because of concern for
individual rights.
While this approach is respectful of certain rights, it is hard to see them
functioning as “trumps” over general welfare: Rights do not give individuals the
power to act (let alone the power to force the state to protect the act) even if the
57. See Lauren Vogel, “COVID-19: A Timeline of Canada’s First-Wave Response,” CMAJ News
(12 June 2020), online: <cmajnews.com/2020/06/12/coronavirus-1095847>.
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action undermines welfare or is deemed by a majority to be undesirable. Rather,
this approach suggests a possible alternative understanding of rights: Rights here
serve as means for restricting government action that might otherwise pass CBA
by giving weight to considerations that are difcult to quantify and as such likely
to be ignored in more quantitative CBA. Conceptualized in this way rights can
be seen as consistent with CBA, and perhaps even as a way of improving CBA in
circumstances of great uncertainty. However, it must be admitted that without
more, this approach can result in a highly imprecise and easily manipulable
CBA. It is unclear how much weight should rights be given within an otherwise
quantitative calculation of costs and benefts.
2. Natural herd immunity: A second approach tried to ride the outbreak in the
hope of achieving natural herd immunity more quickly. Tis was the approach
initially adopted in the United Kingdom, which changed course when mortality
numbers began climbing at alarming rates, and in Sweden, which persisted for a
longer period, until it too somewhat changed course. Tough ofcially denied,
this approach countenances a fairly large number of deaths early in the outbreak
for the sake of maintaining a functioning economy as well as achieving herd
immunity relatively quickly.58 (Swedish ofcials claimed in April 2020 their
country would likely reach that goal in a matter of weeks,59 but later evidence
did not support this claim.60) Tis approach did not call for “business as usual,”
as it encouraged individuals to change their behaviour. Nevertheless, in Sweden
schools and businesses never shut down.

58. See Christina Anderson & Henrik Pryser Libell, “In the Coronavirus Fight in Scandinavia,
Sweden Stands Apart,” Te New York Times (28 March 2020), online: <nytimes.
com/2020/03/28/world/europe/sweden-coronavirus.html>; Catherine Edwards,
“Coronavirus: Will Sweden Ever Have a Total Lockdown?” Te Local se (20 April 2020),
online: <thelocal.se/20200420/coronavirus-will-sweden-ever-have-a-total-lockdown>.
59. See Kim Hjelmgaard, “Swedish Ofcial Anders Tegnell Says ‘Herd Immunity’ in
Sweden Might Be a Few Weeks Away,” USA Today (28 April 2020), online: <usatoday.
com/story/news/world/2020/04/28/coronavirus-covid-19-sweden-anders-tegnell-herdimmunity/3031536001> (interview with the chief epidemiologist at Sweden’s Public
Health Agency).
60. See Maddy Savage, “Did Sweden’s Coronavirus Strategy Succeed or Fail?,” BBC News
(24 July 2020), online: <bbc.com/news/world-europe-53498133>; Anne Grietje
Franssen, “What Does Sweden’s Lower-than-Expected Immunity Mean for the Future
of Its Strategy,” Te Local se (20 November 2020), online: <thelocal.se/20201120/
what-does-swedens-lower-than-expected-immunity-mean-for-the-future-of-its-strategy>.
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Many are now looking at Sweden as an example of a misguided, even callous,
approach.61 Tey point out that Sweden sufered far higher fatality rates than
neighbouring Scandinavian countries that adopted strict lockdown policies,
while still going through a fairly similar economic downturn. At the same time,
Sweden has not been the worst-performing country in Europe. Its economy has
indeed slowed down, although not as badly some European countries. (Tis in
itself is not surprising if shutdown policies in other countries lead to a global
slump in demand, which is likely to afect an export-led economy like Sweden’s.)
While some Swedish ofcials and economists still insist that the diferent policies
should be evaluated at the end of the crisis, others have more recently begun
questioning the wisdom of this approach.62
I am not in a position to address the epidemiological question, but it is
worth remembering that even if it turns out to have been wrong in the end, that
we should not evaluate it with the wisdom of hindsight. From the perspective of
the early months of the pandemic, this approach might be explained as follows:
Given the time it would take to develop a vaccine for the virus, it is unsustainable
to maintain a shutdown that will last over a year. If that is the case, then the
question is not whether the negative outcomes will happen, only when. In that
case, getting the pandemic over with relatively early while building some kind
of herd immunity through infection while keeping the economy open may look
like a rational response. It is, however, a risky response, both in tolerating high
mortality rates early on, as well as in adopting a strategy so out of step with
almost all other countries. For a risk-averse politician there is safety in numbers
in being able to point to a policy adopted throughout the world.
Tus, politically this approach is interesting not because it refects a
fundamentally diferent ideology from the frst approach. (Tere is a certain irony
in how “socialist” Sweden became almost overnight the darling of libertarians the
world over.) No less than the frst approach, the Swedish approach is grounded in
a welfairst attitude that recognizes the role of state in maintaining public health,
and with that role the inevitability of weighing costs against benefts. Instead,
this approach highlights a diferent political factor, the willingness of the Swedish
61. See Paulina Neuding & Tino Sanandaji, “Is Sweden’s Lax Approach to the Coronavirus
Backfring?,” Te Washington Post (8 April 2020), online: <washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2020/04/08/is-swedens-lax-approach-coronavirus-backfring>; cf Timms, supra
note 13 at 40 (without mentioning Sweden, criticizing a herd immunity strategy as
“eliminationist”).
62. See Savage, supra note 60; Charlie Duxbury, “Sweden Split on Coronavirus
Immunity,” Politico (24 July 2020), online: <politico.com/news/2020/07/24/
sweden-catches-frst-glimpse-of-herd-immunity-381117>.
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public to trust public health experts to take a leading role in policy making, even
when it came to questions on which science could not provide clear answers.
(Seen this way, Sweden no longer sounds like the libertarian’s utopia.) Swedish
society has long exhibited “collectivity, homogeneity, and consensualism,” which
together with its high levels of trust in government, explain this deferential
attitude when faced with scientifc uncertainty.63 Tis is one way of dealing with
major gaps in the data needed for CBA, but it is an approach that is hard to
export to places whose political culture is diferent.
3. Closer surveillance: Several countries adopted lockdown policies to which
they added various tracking and surveillance mechanisms as a way of controlling
the spread of the virus. To give a favour of these approaches, “[i]n Singapore, the
details of where patients live, work and play are released quickly online, allowing
others to protect themselves.”64 Similar practices were adopted in South Korea,
where in addition, a new law “allows South Korean health ofcials to access a
wide range of personal data, including cellphone location information and credit
card transactions, without a court order.”65
In many ways this model is similar to the frst one, but it difers from it
in being a “high security, low privacy” model. So far, this model seems to have
been successful, and countries that adopted it (which along with South Korea
include China and Taiwan) have been able to contain the spread of the virus with
a relatively low infection and fatality rates. Tere are diferent possible reasons
for this, including the fact that many of the countries adopting this model have
63. Jon Pierre, “Nudges Against Pandemics: Sweden’s COVID-19 Containment Strategy in
Perspective” (2020) 39 Pol’y & Soc’y 478 at 480, 488, 489; Richard Milne, “Anders Tegnell
and the Swedish Experiment,” Te Financial Times (10 September 2020), online: <ft.com/
content/5cc92d45-fbdb-43b7-9c66-26501693a371>.
64. Hannah Beech, “Tracking the Coronavirus: How Crowded Asian Cities Tackled an
Epidemic,” Te New York Times (17 March 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/17/
world/asia/coronavirus-singapore-hong-kong-taiwan.html>; see also Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan,
“Inside a Two-Week Quarantine in Singapore,” Te Washington Post (3 April 2020), online:
<washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/03/inside-two-week-quarantine-singapore>. For
similar practices in South Korea see Mark Zastrow, “South Korea Is Reporting Intimate
Details of COVID-19 Cases: Has It Helped?,” Nature (18 March 2020), online: <nature.
com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y>.
65. Hyonhee Shin, Hyunjoo Jin & Josh Smith, “How South Korea Turned an Urban Planning
System into a Virus Tracking Database,” Reuters (22 May 2020), online: <reuters.com/article/
us-health-coronavirus-southkorea-tracing/how-south-korea-turned-an-urban-planningsystem-into-a-virus-tracking-database-idUSKBN22Y03I>; see also See Natasha Singer &
Choe Sang-Hun, “As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy Plummets,”
Te New York Times (23 March 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/
coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html>.
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had a relatively recent experience with smaller epidemics, which made both the
government and the population better prepared to respond quickly to the current
outbreak.66 However, it seems that part of the diference in approach may also
have something to do with a diferent political orientation. Specifcally, this
approach may refect greater willingness of people to give up some of their rights
for the sake of the common good.67 Indeed, some news reports from countries
that adopted this strategy described popular eforts to enforce security measures
that went even beyond government-mandated policies.68

IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: THE WELFARE STATE
AND INFORMATION
It would be too facile to say that the three models described in the previous Part
are straightforward application of CBA and just refect diferent weights assigned
to the costs and benefts due to uncertainty. To say this would render CBA
consistent with virtually any policy. So understood, it will confrm what critics of
CBA say of it, that for all its aspirations for rationality and apolitical objectivity,
it is nothing more than a rhetorical device for giving political decisions the patina
of neutral science. But the three approaches do show how political considerations
afect the question of tradeofs that CBA attempts to address.69 Tey can help
guide thinking about risk regulation in cases of lower levels of uncertainty. One
thing that the current situation highlights is the difculty of incorporating CBA
into a political process. As shown, one approach seeks to do so by turning political
66. Eun A Jo, “A Democratic Response to Coronavirus: Lessons from
South Korea,” Te Diplomat (30 March 2020), online: <thediplomat.
com/2020/03/a-democratic-response-to-coronavirus-lessons-from-south-korea>.
67. For examples and discussion of such attitudes from long before the pandemic see Daniel
A Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Tinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton
University Press, 2006) at 73-75.
68. See Raymond Zhong & Paul Mozur, “To Tame Coronavirus, Mao-Style Social
Control Blankets China,” Te New York Times (15 February 2020), online: <nytimes.
com/2020/02/15/business/china-coronavirus-lockdown.html> (reporting on a combination
of government- and community-led eforts to restrict movement); Jo, supra note 66 (“It is the
voluntary cooperation of the citizens that allowed the government to eschew more extreme
measures and maintain a delicate balance between public safety and civil liberties. … South
Korea’s ‘democratic’ response is … a result of public solidarity.”).
69. See Max S Kim, “Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing,” Te New Yorker
(17 April 2020), online: <newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-indigital-contact-tracing> (“few countries were getting away with not sacrifcing some kinds of
freedom. As [law professor] Kim [Min-ho] point out, the true question was which freedoms
to prioritize”).

PRIEL, COVID-19: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND POLITICS 563

attitudes into elements within the CBA calculus. I hinted (at best) at a diferent
approach, one that retains the consequentialist core of CBA but recognizes the
need to incorporate it within a political system.
I will conclude by briefy mentioning one example, which touches on one
question that gets frequently asked these days: What will be the long-term
efects of the pandemic? Tis question can, of course, be the subject of whole
books. Te one aspect of it I will consider here is the efects the shutdown
policies will have on the role of the state. Te three models I considered in the
previous Part ft a broad defnition a “welfare states,” by which I mean states
that take an active role in managing and reducing a wide range of risks that
individuals face. Tis defnition does not cover everything that states do, but it
is not idiosyncratic either. It is based on the idea that a major role of the state
is provide, or manage the provision of, security. In this sense there is continuity
between the nineteenth-century night-watchman state as a provider of security
against certain risks and the twentieth-century welfare state that provides security
against a wider range of risks.70
Despite this continuity, it is also true that in the course of the twentieth
century states “grew” in size compared to their nineteenth-century counterparts.
One factor in this expansion in the role of the state came with the advent of new
technologies, which made security against more risks possible. By “technologies,”
I mean human inventions, both physical (computing machines, tracking devices)
and intellectual (statistics, probability), that made it possible to collect and analyze
vast amounts of information. Much of what welfare states do requires, if it is to be
done well, the deployment of these technologies. Te great responsibilities that
came with the assumption of great powers have created the information-hogging
beast that is the welfare state. Tis beast—Hobbes called the state “Leviathan”
for a reason—is both a (the) major provider of security and a (the) major source

70. Cf Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Teory of Liberal Democracy (University
of Chicago Press, 1995) at ch 8 (arguing for continuity between classical liberalism and
welfare). More specifcally Holmes also shows that the association of freedom with security
is not novel (see ibid at 245). See also Emma Rothschild, “What Is Security?” (1995) 124:3
Dædalus 53 at 61-63. What may have changed is the greater tendency to speak of this kind
of government action as an enhancement of freedom rather than as an intrusion into it. See
Lord Macmillan, Law & Other Tings (Cambridge University Press, 1937) at 8-9 (“I am not
less but more the captain of my soul in a city which is well sewered, well paved, well policed,
and free from slums and the diseases they breed, in which the education, the health and
welfare of my fellow-citizens are promoted by sensible measures”); James M Landis, “Law
and the New Liberties” (1939) 4 Mo L Rev 105 at 108; cf ER Hopkins, “Administrative
Justice in Canada” (1939) 19 Can Bar Rev 619 at 626-27.
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of potential insecurity. Te primary motivation for limiting government power is
also a reason to want to strengthen it.
Tis is the paradox at the heart of the liberal welfare state: to be efective,
it requires a lot of information about—and thus inevitably potential control
over—individuals, all for the sake of maintaining security, which is in turn
justifed for promoting human independence. Tis is not an easy position to hold:
Superfcially, in their opposite ways, libertarians and authoritarians seem more
consistent. Te COVID-19 pandemic puts considerable strain on the welfare
state, not just in the obvious sense of the enormous expenditures governments are
currently incurring while simultaneously facing a signifcant shortfall in revenue.
Te pandemic also strains the welfare state in a deeper sense, in expanding state
power, which inevitably brings with it greater risks to individual security, for the
sake of greater security.
As shown above, some of the most successful countries in controlling the
spread of COVID-19 have done so by adopting privacy-invasive policies. Various
plans proposed for a return to normalcy in countries that followed the frst model
have almost invariably relied on implementing technological tools that in efect
move them toward this model.71 To anyone who accepts the logic of CBA, this
approach could be justifed as an acceptable response to an emergency: Te use
of intrusive technology has signifcant costs, which while not justifed in normal
times, could pass CBA muster during a pandemic. An emergency is a time of a
heightened risk of a signifcant loss, the prevention of which justifes incurring
greater costs. But history has shown that times of emergency (real or perceived)
are rarely times of rational response; it has also shown that once granted,

71. See Ezra Klein, “I’ve Read the Plans to Reopen the Economy. Tey’re Scary,” Vox (10
April 2020), online: <vox.com/2020/4/10/21215494/coronavirus-plans-social-distancingeconomy-recession-depression-unemployment>; Gideon Lichfeld, “We’re Not Going
Back to Normal,” MIT Technology Review (17 March 2020), online: <technologyreview.
com/2020/03/17/905264/coronavirus-pandemic-social-distancing-18-months>; Norimitsu
Onishi & Constant Méheut, “France Weighs Its Love of Liberty in Fight Against
Coronavirus,” Te New York Times (17 April 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/04/17/
world/europe/coronavirus-france-digital-tracking.html>; Natasha Singer & Choe Sang-Hun,
“As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy Plummets,” Te New York Times
(17 April 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillancetracking-privacy.html>.
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“temporary” powers are often difcult to roll back.72 Would emergency measures
adopted today become the new normal?73
Tis is an example of the way even those, like me, who are sympathetic to
CBA must acknowledge that it is not a technocratic means of avoiding politics.
Serious thinking about the way CBA is incorporated into politics will have to go
beyond measuring the costs of those whose favoured moral or political views are
disappointed. Tese issues and tensions existed, of course, before the pandemic.
A year ago, a lot of public debate revolved around maintaining privacy in an age
of ubiquitous digital technology. Tese debates are much subdued now, but one
day we will go back to them. When that happens, the way they are reshaped by
the pandemic may prove to be one of its most lasting efects.

72. Cf John Dryzek & Robert E Goodin, “Risk-Sharing and Social Justice: Te Motivational
Foundations of the Post-War Welfare State” (1986) 16 Brit J Pol Sci 1 at 11-21 (showing
how an expansion in government expenditure during World War II was not entirely rolled
back after the war).
73. Cf Zhong, supra note 32 (“ofcials in some places [in China] are loading their
[virus-tracking] apps with new features, hoping the software will live on as more than just an
emergency measure”).

